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1. Introduction 
Adam Smith’s metaphor of the invisible hand illustrates the idea that decentralized 
interaction of independent actors, through market exchange, leads to an efficient 
allocation of societal resources. In fact, there exists widespread evidence that 
markets often fulfill this function. However, unregulated market exchange is also 
often blamed as a source of social ills. For example, citing accounts of 
environmental damage, animal cruelty, unsafe working conditions and persistent 
inequality, many scholars have raised the question of whether the inherent nature of 
market exchange has a perverting influence on people’s motivations to exhibit 
concern for the social impact of their actions (Bowles, 1998; Sandel, 2012; Falk and 
Szech, 2013; Besley 2013).  
Indeed, returning to the efficacy of the “invisible hand,” an important 
underlying condition is the absence of negative externalities. When the social costs 
of market activity are not borne by the trading parties in the market—as in many of 
the examples above—then markets can systematically underappreciate such impacts, 
absent some other channel through which they are incorporated. Hence, a standard 
response to the problem of external effects is to call for an active role for 
government in regulating or taxing activities that impose externalities, as one 
possible way to internalize their impact.  
However, an alternative remedy occurs if market participants voluntarily 
take into consideration the social impacts of their actions, thereby resulting in a 
partial or full internalization of external costs. For example, firms may voluntarily 
incur additional production costs in order to avoid exposing communities where 
production occurs to harm or risks, and consumers may be willing to pay higher 
prices for products that mitigate such potential harm. Thus, the notion of individual 
and corporate “social responsibility,” or the willingness to sacrifice profits or 
personal wealth in pursuit of broader social interest, has recently come into focus as 
a means to prevent efficiency losses due to external effects (Bénabou and Tirole, 
2010).1 The presence of product categories such as “carbon free,” “fair trade” and 
“cruelty free” in consumer products markets—often associated with higher 
production costs for firms and prices for consumers—reflects the potential influence 
of concerns for social impact. 
The possibility that market participants voluntarily internalize the external 
impacts of their actions is also supported by evidence from research on non-market 
decision making, which regularly documents a willingness to consider the impact of 
one’s actions on others (e.g., Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Fisman, et al., 2007; 
Cappelen, et al., 2007). The fact that people often show concern for others’ welfare 
in choice contexts such as dictator games (Hoffman, et al., 1994; Engel, 2011) 
suggests that such concern may exist as well with respect to externalities in market 
settings. However, there is also considerable evidence, which we review below, 
indicating that repeated exchange in competitive markets often crowds out or erodes 
                                                            
1 This notion is, however, far from new. For example, Arrow (1970) called “attention to a less visible 
form of social action: norms of social behavior, including ethical and moral codes” and suggested “as 
one possible interpretation that they are reactions of society to compensate for market failures” (p. 
22). 
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concerns with fairness and equality, at least between the directly interacting trading 
parties in the market (Roth, et al., 1991; Franciosi, et al., 1995). The question of 
whether market exchange and competition similarly eliminate concern with the 
welfare of externality-bearing third parties, who are uninvolved as buyers or sellers 
in a market, remains largely an open question.  
We report a laboratory experiment showing that socially responsible 
behavior by firms and consumers in markets can, indeed, mitigate the fundamental 
problem of negative external effects. Our experiment models a competitive product 
market, in which sellers post prices and consumers can choose which products to 
buy, or whether to buy a product at all. Sellers decide on a price and on which type 
of product they want to offer for sale—either one that produces a large negative 
externality for a third party or one that does not, with the latter involving higher 
production costs. Thus, our experiment includes a production technology that allows 
market participants to avoid the external harm caused by exchange, as long as they 
are willing to incur the corresponding costs. In a baseline market case, following 
firms’ decisions, consumers observe the set of offered products and then make 
purchasing decisions from the set of available posted product offers. We allow 
repetition, in order to obtain a sense of what kind of outcomes arise with experience 
in the market. The standard equilibrium prediction for these markets is that only the 
cheaper good, which produces the externality, is traded.  
In contrast, we find that the market converges to a stable outcome in which a 
significant proportion (roughly 45 percent) of products traded cost more to produce, 
but yield no externality. The prices for such goods are also regularly higher than 
prices for the externality-producing products, though to a lesser extent than the full 
additional production cost. Thus, in our markets, both sellers and buyers share, on 
average, some of the burden for preventing the negative externality. Both 
manifestations of social responsibility are stable over time. We interpret these 
findings as evidence that significant and robust preferences over considerations such 
as social impact, fairness and morality can persist in competitive market exchange. 
We also conduct additional variants of the market to test the robustness of 
social responsibility to varying market conditions. In particular, we study two 
factors.  
First, we study the effect of increased competition between sellers on social 
responsibility. Specifically, we add supra-marginal firms to the market, which 
should theoretically have no effect. However, increased competition is often argued 
to diminish concerns with fairness (Roth, et al., 1991) and, more broadly, is often 
highlighted as a potentially corrupting influence in economic and market behavior 
(Shleifer, 2004; Cai and Liu, 2009; Brandts, et al., 2009). In our market, competition 
does drive down overall prices, thus yielding greater relative surplus for consumers 
at the expense of firms. However, there is no detrimental effect of increased 
competition on the degree of concern exhibited toward externality-bearing parties 
outside of the market. In fact, the market share of products that yield no externality 
increases slightly under increased firm competition, relative to our market baseline, 
as does the price premium for the socially responsible product. Thus, instead of 
decreasing the expression of social responsibility, increased market competition in 
this case seems to have, if anything, the opposite effect. One possible interpretation 
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for this finding is that, as competition yields increased surplus for consumers, they 
become more willing to bear the costs associated with mitigating the externality for 
third parties. 
Second, we consider the possibility that consumers may have limited 
information about the degree of externality produced by available products, but have 
the ability to learn about such product characteristics. This reflects the fact that 
many consumers do not know which firms’ products are, for example, 
environmentally or socially harmful, but that such information is often available if a 
consumer chooses to acquire it. We study both a case in which the information is 
free to consumers and one in which acquiring it involves the consumer incurring a 
small cost. In both cases, we find that the need for consumers to actively acquire 
product information regarding social impact has only a small effect—though slightly 
larger when acquiring information is costly—on the expression of social 
responsibility in the market.2 
We also conduct a condition that allows us to directly compare the strength 
of the social concern exhibited by participants in our market experiment with social 
concern expressed in a comparable individual, dictator-like, choice context. To this 
end, we present a novel group of subjects exactly the same choices as those faced by 
consumers in the baseline market, with identical monetary consequences for the 
decision maker and for two other participants (reflecting, implicitly, the roles of 
sellers and externality-bearing third parties from the market condition). We find that 
the frequency of choices mitigating the negative social impact on third parties in this 
individual (non-market) context is only slightly higher than in our market condition. 
Thus, while, qualitatively, we find that the market yields less socially responsible 
outcomes than in comparable individual non-market behavior (cf. Falk and Szech, 
2013), the effect is not very large.  
As a complement to the analysis of aggregate market outcomes, we estimate 
simple choice models of consumer and firm behavior from our experimental data. 
For consumers in the market conditions—and individual decision makers in our 
non-market condition—we estimate a multinomial logit choice model (McFadden, 
1974) in which we allow utility to be determined both by a consumer’s own material 
profit (i.e., the value of a product purchase minus the price paid) and by the social 
impact of a product purchase or choice. This analysis reveals that the choices made 
by individuals in all conditions of our experiment demonstrate a positive concern for 
both sources of utility. Thus, consumers in all of our market conditions, as well as 
individual decision makers in the non-market condition, exhibit concern for social 
responsibility, which can be modeled as a standard utility-enhancing product 
attribute. We also study firms’ product supply decisions, and find that firms respond 
sensibly to market conditions—such as consumers’ product type choices and relative 
                                                            
2 Such limited information, along with an apparent desire to remain willfully ignorant to the harmful 
consequences of one’s actions, has been shown to be a factor that significantly diminishes pro-social 
behavior in many individual choice settings (Dana, et al., 2007; Larson and Capra, 2009). We find 
limited information to have a much smaller effect in our market context. One possible interpretation 
for this difference is that the market context already affords those people who would rely on 
ignorance as a justification for selfish behavior sufficient other justifications to render the impact of 
default ignorance less important.  
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prices—but that their behavior also exhibits a persistent concern among some firms 
for social responsibility.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we 
review some of the related literature. Then, in Section 3, we describe our 
experimental design. Section 4 presents the results of our market conditions with 
regard to the market share and price premium of the fair product, while Section 5 
presents analyses that use the combined results to estimate models of firm and 
consumer behavior. Section 6 compares the behavior of consumers in our market 
conditions to individual allocation choices in a comparable non-market context. 
Finally, Section 7 concludes and provides a broad interpretation of our combined 
results. 
 
2. Relation to Previous Literature 
Our findings are surprising in light of an extensive literature showing that 
experimental markets generally converge toward equilibrium predictions in which 
considerations such as fairness have minimal impact and one side of the market 
(firms or consumers) captures most or all of the surplus (Smith, 1962; Plott and 
Smith, 1978; Roth, et al., 1991; Holt, 1995; Franciosi, et al., 1995). This has even 
been shown in cases where product purchases create negative externalities for other 
market participants (Plott, 1983). It has thus often been argued that fairness and 
social considerations are minimally important in market settings. A key distinction 
between this prior work and our experiment, however, is that the kind of social 
impact we study deals not primarily with fairness or inequality among directly 
interacting market participants—such as firms and consumers—but, rather, with 
fairness toward individuals entirely uninvolved with the exchange process in the 
market that determines the externality. This is often the case, for example, in 
situations where production and exchange yield widespread negative social impacts, 
such as environmental pollution or persistent inequality, or harm to those unable to 
exert agency, as in the case of forced labor or animal testing. Our experiment creates 
a simplified version of such settings, in which the behavior of market participants 
impacts someone uninvolved in the market in which the product is exchanged.3 We 
find concerns for the social impact on such passive external individuals to be 
persistently manifested in market behavior and outcomes. 
Our results also contrast with a prominent argument that market exchange 
crowds out moral values (e.g., Sandel, 2012).4 Much of the evidence supporting this 
argument, however, is indirect and does not study the behavior of individuals 
interacting through markets. For example, experimental findings reveal that the 
framing of a non-market interaction with market labels and terminology reduces the 
                                                            
3 In this regard, our experiment also creates parallels between the study of social behavior in markets 
and the vast literature on dictator games, where the social impact of decision makers’ actions are felt 
by passive parties with no decision making power.  
4 A distinct argument is that the properties of markets may not necessarily eliminate moral 
considerations from the preferences of market participants, but may make them irrelevant under 
certain conditions governing exchange (Sobel 2009, 2010; Dufwenberg, et al., 2011). Another related 
argument is that “repugnance” to certain kinds of market transactions should be accounted for in the 
use and design of markets for exchange (Roth, 2007). 
 
 
5
apparent importance of moral considerations—such as equality and social welfare—
among interacting participants (Hoffman, et al., 1994; Ross and Ward, 1996).5 
Similarly, the act of assigning monetary value to “good” behaviors, through prices, 
has been argued to produce a crowding out of intrinsic motivations for such acts 
(Frey, et al., 1996; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000; Mellström and Johannesson, 
2008). In psychological research, priming people to think of money, in contrast with 
similar non-monetary primes, leads to more individualistic and less pro-social 
behavior (Vohs, et al., 2006; see also, Kube, et al., 2012). Thus, while there is 
considerable indirect evidence of the perverting effect of market exchange—i.e., 
factors associated with markets appear to diminish the importance of moral 
motivations—there is little direct evidence on whether moral considerations are truly 
eroded by market interaction.  
One recent study, by Falk and Szech (2013), does study the behavior of 
participants interacting in bilateral and multi-lateral double-auction markets in a 
context where, like in our study, market exchange can produce social harm whose 
impact is not felt by market participants—in their case, the negative social impact is 
the loss of life of a mouse. They find that repeated market interaction generally 
yields less socially responsible behavior than one-shot non-market decisions, and 
that market experience further devalues apparent concern for the external impact of 
market exchange. This stands in contrast to our experiment, where the magnitude of 
the difference between market and non-market social concern is much smaller, 
where the market share for the socially responsible product is stable across time, and 
where one measure of social concern—the price premium for the socially 
responsible product—even increases over time.  
However, specific features of the design employed by Falk and Szech merit 
further consideration in understanding better whether markets, in general, erode 
concerns for social impact. For example, while the extreme nature of the potential 
externality (the death of a mouse) is an eye-catching and fascinating feature of their 
design, studying morality in markets with varying and possibly less extreme 
characteristics is important for understanding many non-laboratory contexts, where 
tradeoffs are not between money and death, but rather between different 
distributions of resources or wealth.6 In this regard, our approach employs a more 
standard economic methodology by comparing monetary profits for market 
participants with monetary harm for those affected by a negative externality. This 
design, more easily suited for future replication and study, also allows easier 
evaluations of the welfare and efficiency properties of the market. Moreover, while 
double-auction markets, as employed by Falk and Szech, are a workhorse of 
experimental economic research (e.g., Smith, 1962), they are often more 
representative of real-world contexts better described as “bargaining” than many 
                                                            
5 See, also, Cappelen, et al. (2013), who show that an alternate manner of priming people with a 
market context produces a small, but statistically insignificant, increase in the propensity to lie. 
6 Furthermore, an extreme consequence such as death may trigger strong negative emotional reactions 
in individual choice contexts, which are then diminished by market activity. While consistent with the 
idea that markets diminish moral concern, this might not generally be the case in situations where the 
externality elicits a less extreme emotional reaction, and where moral considerations are weighted 
more deliberatively (cf. Greene, et al., 2001). 
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product or labor markets, where one-sided posted offers are a more typical market 
structure.7  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, in Falk and Szech’s experiment there 
is only one production technology, which necessarily requires the imposition of the 
negative externality if exchange is to occur.8 However, many real-world markets are 
characterized by a multiplicity of production technologies, some of which may 
create fewer negative externalities than others. Indeed, a valuable characteristic of 
markets is that, where a preference to employ a technology that limits external harm 
exists, market incentives and competition are likely to lead to its use. Thus, unlike in 
the study by Falk and Szech, where market exchange is incompatible with acting in 
a socially responsible manner, our experimental design allows social responsibility 
to be manifested in market exchange—as long as the trading parties are willing to 
bear the necessary costs.  
The conclusions of our study lie closer to research suggesting that markets 
and social or moral considerations are compatible. For example, an alternative 
perspective to that described above arises from evidence that exposure of developing 
societies to market interaction facilitates the adoption of pro-social norms, e.g., of 
fairness and cooperation (Henrich, et al., 2001; Bowles 2011). For example, 
Henrich, et al. (2010), find that communities with greater degrees of reliance on and 
integration into markets for exchange—measured, in this case, as the proportion of 
households’ total caloric consumption that is purchased rather than self-produced—
also exhibit the most egalitarian behaviors in experimental games. The interpretation 
is that successful market exchange requires the development of norms of fairness 
and cooperation that apply to even impersonal interaction between parties. Our study 
shows, directly, that behavior consistent with such norms can persist as a feature of 
market exchange.9  
In this sense, our findings also have some similarity to studies demonstrating 
that efficiency-enhancing reciprocity between buyers and sellers—as when, for 
example, contractual incompleteness make trust and trustworthiness necessary for 
efficient exchange—persists in many kinds of markets (Fehr, et al., 1993; Fehr and 
Falk, 1999). While the precise nature of these results is very distinct from our work, 
in which contracts between buyers and sellers are complete and in which market 
behavior impacts third parties uninvolved with the market, we establish a similar 
finding that socially responsible behavior can persist in competitive markets. 
 
                                                            
7 Smith (1962) contrasted double-auction markets with a posted offer market, which “was intended to 
simulate approximately an ordinary retail market. In such markets, in the United States, sellers 
typically take the initiative in advertising their offer prices, with buyers electing to buy or not to buy 
rather than taking part in a haggling and bargaining process” (p. 124). Our experiment is intended to 
model such product markets, where discussions of social responsibility are often focused. 
8 This is also the case in the markets with negative externalities among market participants studied by 
Plott (1983). 
9 Evidence for the importance of fairness norms in markets also comes from questionnaire survey 
studies. Kahneman, et al. (1986) report that that any change in offer prices by firms in the short run 
that is not justified by a cost increase is considered as unfair by consumers. They argue that such 
fairness norms imply that markets may not clear if a price increase in response to excess demand 
(e.g., for snow shovels after a snowstorm) is not justified by an increase in supply costs. 
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3. Experimental Design 
3.1 The Market Game 
We develop a novel experimental market environment that contains important 
features of real-world product markets. Firms and consumers can exchange two 
types of products, one of which imposes a negative externality on a third party. For 
simplicity, we label the product that produces no externality for the third party 
(e � 0), i.e., the socially responsible product, as the “fair” product and the product 
that generates a negative externality (e � 1) as the “unfair” product. 
 The production cost of the unfair product is normalized to zero. This product 
is worth 50 to the consumer, thus generating a surplus of 50 when exchanged. 
However, exchange of this product imposes a negative externality of 60 on a third 
party, thus making exchange of this product socially harmful and inefficient, with a 
net welfare impact of 50 � 60 � �10. In contrast, the fair product has a production 
cost of 10 that is borne by the firm, but has no impact on the third party. Thus, 
exchange of the fair product is efficient, as it generates a net surplus of 50 � 10 �
40.  
Our Market Baseline condition consists of six firms, five consumers and five 
third parties. All players start with 100 units of wealth. Each firm offers a single 
product, either e � 0 or e � 1, in a posted-offer market, at a price, p, determined by 
that firm. Consumers enter the market sequentially (in a randomly determined 
order), observe the current menu of prices and product types, and either choose a 
single product offer or reject all available offers. A firm can sell at most one product. 
Hence, while the consumer who enters the market first can choose among all six 
product offers, consumers who enter later can only choose from those offers that 
remain. Since there are six firms but only five consumers, even the last consumer 
entering the market can choose among at least two product offers. There is, 
however, always at least one firm that cannot sell its product.  
The payoff of each of the five third parties is determined by one of the five 
possible exchanges between firms and consumers in the market. The purchase of an 
unfair product by a consumer reduces a third party’s payoff by 60 units, while either 
the purchase of a fair product or a consumer’s decision not to purchase any product 
yield no impact on the corresponding third party’s payoff. 
 Equations (1) to (3) summarize the payoffs in a period. A firm receives 
100	 � 	�	– 	10 ∙ �1 � e� if it sells its product, and 100 otherwise. A consumer 
receives 100	 � 	50	– 	� if she buys a product, and 100 otherwise. A consumer’s 
payoff thus does not depend on the type of product she buys. The third party’s 
payoff is 100	– 	60 ∙ e, meaning that the third party is only negatively impacted in 
the case where a consumer and firm exchange an unfair product.10  
 
                                                            
10 Notice that the production costs (in case of � � 0) or the externality (in case of � � 1) arise only if 
a product is sold, not if a product is just offered. This design feature can be interpreted as a 
“production on demand” technology. We chose this design feature—rather than, perhaps, one in 
which the externality is created at the time of the product type choice by firms—in order to create a 
situation in which exchange between buyers and sellers creates the externality. In this regard, our 
design is similar to that of Falk and Szech (2013). 
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Π���� � �100 � � � 10 � �1 � ��100  
�� ��� ����� ��� ������� �� ��������
���������  (1) 
Π�������� � �100 � �0 � �100   
�� �� ���� � ������� �� ����� �
���������  (2) 
Π���������� � �100 � �0 � �100  
�� ��� ������� �������� ���� ���������
���������  (3) 
 
Subjects play 24 rounds of the market game in fixed groups (16-person 
markets) and roles. We eliminate the possibility of cross-period reputation by not 
showing subjects the ID numbers of other market participants and by randomly 
ordering the display of product offers in each period. One round is randomly chosen 
for payment at the end of the experiment. 
We introduce an explicit market context in the instructions by giving the 
three types of roles natural interpretations. Players A are described as “sellers” and 
Players B as “buyers” and they are told they can “trade” different “types of 
products” at the offered “prices.” Player C is neutrally described as “Player C,” and 
the two types of products are called  “product without impact on player C” (in case 
of � � 0) and “product with loss for player C” (in case of � � 0). An English 
translation of the original German instructions for the Market Baseline condition is 
included in the Appendix. 
 
3.2 Varying Market Characteristics 
To study the robustness of the behavior in the Market Baseline condition, we 
implemented three additional market variants that changed important characteristics 
of the market. Specifically, we varied the degree of competition between firms in the 
market, the information that consumers have about the types of available products, 
and the cost of becoming informed about the characteristics of products.  
 First, in a High Firm Competition condition, we increase the number of firms 
from six to eight. There are thus always at least three firms in this condition—rather 
than one in the Market Baseline—that are unable to sell their product offers in each 
period. Apart from this difference in the number of firms, this condition is otherwise 
identical to the Market Baseline condition. We expect this increased competition 
between firms will lead to prices closer to the competitive equilibrium—posted-offer 
markets typically produce prices above the competitive equilibrium (Plot and Smith, 
1978; Ketcham, et al., 1984)—than in the Market Baseline. Our primary focus, 
however, is on how this increased competition affects the manifestation of social 
responsibility, e.g., the market share of the fair product. 
Second, we conducted two Limited Information conditions, in which 
consumers initially have no information regarding the types of different products. In 
these conditions, consumers initially only observe the price of each available 
product, though they are aware that the products might vary based on their social 
impact on the third party. In both cases, we give consumers the ability to become 
informed—i.e., to learn the social impact of all available products. The two 
conditions vary how costly it is for consumers to acquire such information. 
In the Limited Information (Free) condition, the types of all products (� � 0 
or � � 1) are initially unknown to consumers. A consumer can, however, reveal the 
types of products at no monetary cost, simply by clicking a button. A consumer who 
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enters the market thus only sees the prices of the remaining products but not the 
types of these products. A consumer then has the option to purchase a product 
without ever learning its type (recall that the monetary value of the product to the 
consumer does not depend on the type of the product) or to reveal the product types, 
first, and then make a purchasing decision. Apart from the fact that consumers do 
not learn the types of products by default when entering the market, this condition is 
identical to the Market Baseline. However, it allows us to identify whether an 
alternative, more natural, informational default affects behavior and market 
outcomes.  
Finally, the Limited Information (Costly) condition is identical, apart from 
the fact that a consumer in this condition has to pay a small cost, of 1 unit, if she 
chooses to reveal the types of the available products before making a purchasing 
decision. This condition adds the realistic feature that it is costly for consumers to 
become informed about the social impact of their products, perhaps discouraging 
many of them from doing so, or providing a rationalization for possible harm 
inflicted on the third party.  
 
3.3 The No Market Condition 
In order to provide a non-market benchmark against which to compare the behavior 
and outcomes in our market conditions, we conducted a No Market condition. This 
condition mimics the standard distributional decision tasks (i.e., dictator games) 
typically used to measure fairness and concerns for social impact in individual 
choice experiments.  
Our design creates a precise parallel between the monetary consequences of 
the “product” choices made by consumers in a given round in the Market Baseline 
and the “allocation” choices made by decision makers in our No Market condition. 
To achieve this, we present each decision maker in the No Market condition with the 
exact sequence of choices faced by a “yoked” consumer in the Market Baseline 
condition. That is, for each consumer in the Market Baseline, who faced a sequence 
of 24 menus of product offers, we have a decision maker in the No Market 
condition, who faces a sequence of 24 identical, in monetary terms, neutrally framed 
allocation choices.11 
 We implement three-person groups (players “A,” “B,” and “C”), in which 
players B (corresponding to “consumers” in our market conditions) choose between 
different allocations of payoffs among all three players, as in a three-person dictator 
game. Players A and C are thus inactive in this condition. The assignment of 
subjects to roles is fixed for the 24 rounds. One of the 24 rounds of the No Market 
treatment is randomly chosen to determine payoffs at the end of a session.  
                                                            
11 For example, suppose a consumer in Market Baseline can choose between two different products in 
a given round: one fair product at price, � � �0, and one unfair product at price, � � ��. Recall that 
there is also always an option not to buy a product at all. Then the corresponding choice options for 
player B in the No Market condition in the respective round are the following three allocations: either 
120 for player A (�00 � �0 � �0), 120 for player B (�00 � �0 � �0), and 100 for player C (�00 �
0), or 115 for player A (�00 � �� � 0), 125 for player B (�00 � �0 � ��), and 40 for player C 
(�00 � �0), or 100 for each player. 
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While the Market Baseline condition includes various features of market 
contexts—endogenously determined choice sets, contextual labels such as “prices,” 
“products,” “buyers” and “sellers”—these are absent from the No Market condition. 
For example, instructions in the No Market condition (see Appendix) provide no 
interpretation for the roles of participants “A,” “B,” and “C,” and instead include 
descriptions such as, “Player B,” who can choose among “allocations,” not product 
offers. Subjects are also not told how the allocations were generated but instead are 
simply told that they will see a given set of possible allocations in each round. Thus, 
rather than attempting to understand how variation in one such factor influences 
social concern, we use this design primarily to compare how individuals confront 
tradeoffs between personal benefits and the welfare of others in two very distinct 
settings: neutrally framed individual choice contexts, similar to the widely studied 
dictator game, and in a context designed to mimic product markets.  
 
3.4 Predictions
The standard economic assumptions of self-interest and rationality yield the same 
prediction for all the market conditions: consumers purchase only the unfair product, 
which is traded at a price of zero.12 The resulting outcomes are maximally 
inefficient, since each unit of the unfair good traded results in a net social loss.  
Our experiment also allows the possibility of socially responsible behavior, 
reflected in market share and prices. If concern for social impact is a persistent 
characteristic of market participants’ preferences, then we expect a positive and 
constant market share for the fair product.13 Moreover, it is reasonable to expect 
some burden of the additional production cost of the fair product to be borne by 
socially conscious consumers, reflected in a price premium for such products.14  
 
3.5 Session Overview and Number of Observations 
We conducted 7 markets of the Market Baseline condition, across 5 sessions.15 Of 
the 112 subjects who participated in the Market Baseline, 42 subjects were in the 
role of a firm, 35 in the role of a consumer, and 35 in the role of a third party. We 
conducted 6 markets, each, of the High Firm Competition, Limited Information 
(Free), and Limited Information (Costly) conditions; this was done in 4 separate 
sessions for each condition. Thus, 108 subjects participated in the High Firm 
                                                            
12 In experimental posted-offer markets similar to those we use here, prices often remain above the 
competitive equilibrium, with only slow convergence. Comparisons with double auction markets 
suggest that this deviation from equilibrium price is not driven by fairness concerns but by the firms’ 
power to post prices (Plot and Smith, 1978; Ketcham, et al., 1984). Therefore, even under the 
assumption of self-interest, we may observe prices above zero. 
13 We do not propose a formal model of social responsibility in this paper. However, as we show in 
the Appendix, a straightforward application of a standard model of social preferences (Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999) to our setting reveals that firms and consumers concerned with fairness and inequality 
are willing to pay additional costs for socially responsible products that do not harm the third party.  
14 Theoretically, it is possible for the entire burden of social responsibility to be borne by firms, as 
long as these are sufficiently concerned with social impact (see Appendix). However, if consumers 
share any of the additional production costs for fair products, then this willingness to pay for socially 
responsible goods will be reflected in a price premium. 
15 In some sessions of our market conditions we had a sufficient number of subjects to run two 
independent markets in parallel; in others we conducted a single market only.  
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Competition condition and 96 subjects participated in each of the Limited 
Information conditions. We also conducted 3 sessions of the No Market condition, 
with 105 subjects in total. Thus, altogether 517 subjects participated in our 
experiment. Table 1 gives an overview of our treatment conditions and the number 
of observations. 
Table 1. Session Overview and Number of Observations 
Treatment Markets 
Firms 
(Participant 
A) 
Consumers 
(Participant 
B) 
Third Parties 
(Participant 
C) 
Market Baseline 7 42 35 35 
High Firm Competition 6 48 30 30 
Limited Information – 
Free 6 36 30 30 
Limited Information – 
Costly 6 36 30 30 
No Market - 35 35 35 
3.6 General Procedures 
All sessions took place at the computer laboratory of the Department of Economics 
at the University of Zurich. The study was conducted through computer terminals, 
using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were mainly students from 
the University of Zurich and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) in 
Zurich. Students majoring in economics or psychology were not eligible to 
participate. We conducted a between-subjects design; that is, each subject 
participated in only one condition. 
Before subjects entered the lab, each subject randomly drew a place card that 
specified at which computer terminal to sit. The terminal number determined a 
subject’s role as either firm (participant A), consumer (participant B), or third party 
(participant C). Subjects received written instructions, including comprehension 
questions that had to be answered correctly before a session could begin. A 
summary of the instructions was read aloud by the experimenter to ensure common 
information.  
Sessions lasted about 1.5 hours. Payoffs from the experiment, denominated 
in “points,” were converted into money at the rate of 10 points to CHF 2.50 (CHF 1 
≈ $ 1 at the time of the experiment) at the end of a session. On average, subjects 
earned about CHF 42.5, which includes a show-up fee of CHF 15.  
 
4. Market Shares and Prices  
In discussing the results, we proceed as follows. In this section, we first present the 
results of our Market Baseline condition, to identify the extent to which concerns for 
the welfare of third parties are reflected in market outcomes, such as market shares 
and relative prices for the two kinds of products. Then, we study how varying 
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market conditions, including increased firm competition and limited consumer 
information, influence socially responsible market behavior.  
In Section 5, we shift our attention from aggregate outcomes to the 
individual behavior of consumers and firms. Finally in Section 6, we address the 
issue of whether concerns for social impact are diminished by markets, relative to 
the concern observed in non-market individual choice contexts, by comparing 
consumers’ choices in our Market Baseline condition to individual allocation 
choices in our No Market condition.  
 
4.1 Market Baseline
In 99 percent of cases (831 of 840 consumer periods), consumers purchased a 
product. Therefore, our analysis will primarily focus on the realized purchases by 
consumers; unless otherwise noted, we ignore cases in which a consumer made no 
product purchase.  
Figure 1. Fair Product Purchases across Varying Market Conditions
 
 
The solid line in Figure 1 displays the proportion of fair products purchased 
by consumers across time in the Market Baseline condition. This statistic identifies 
how often the externality on third parties was mitigated and, therefore, corresponds 
to the efficiency of the market. To smooth random variation across periods, we 
report data aggregated across three-period blocks.16 
                                                            
16 A potentially different measure of the fair product share in the market, not reported in the graph, is 
the proportion of fair products offered for sale by firms. While this could, potentially, differ from the 
proportion of fair products actually bought—if, for example, one kind of product was systematically 
left unsold—the data reveal no substantive difference: the two proportions never differ by more than 
3 percent in any three-period block. 
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The figure reveals a large and stable share of fair products in the Market 
Baseline condition. The share of fair products is 50 percent in the first three periods, 
then decreases slightly, but remains between 42 and 46 percent in all remaining 
three-period blocks. Thus, as measured by market share, we observe a persistent 
manifestation of socially responsible behavior in market exchange, with almost half 
of the realized exchanges demonstrating an apparent concern for avoiding the 
imposition of the externality. 
To provide a statistical basis for the claim that the proportion of fair products 
does not decrease over time, Table 2 reports probit regressions, with subject random 
effects, of consumers’ product choices. All three models include period as an 
explanatory variable, and the coefficient for this variable is never statistically 
significant. Models 2 and 3 restrict the data to those periods in which a consumer 
saw both kinds of products (remember that the sequential nature of the market meant 
that consumers acting later saw subsets of the original set of products offered). 
Again, there is no significant time trend in this data.  
 
Table 2. Random-effects Probit Regressions of Fair Consumer Product Choice in 
Market Baseline Condition
 All periods 
Consumer saw both kinds of 
products 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Period -0.007 -0.013 0.014 
(0.008) (0.010) (0.022) 
Low price of fair product -0.403*** 
(0.074) 
Low price of unfair product 0.385*** 
(0.063) 
Constant -0.009 0.180 2.275 
(0.211) (0.248) (1.826) 
Observations 831 621 621 
Number of subjects 35 35 35 
Omits the nine cases in which a consumer made no product purchase 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Model 3 reveals that consumers respond sensibly to market prices: they are 
less likely to purchase the fair product as the lowest price at which one is available 
increases and, conversely, they are more likely to buy a fair product as the lowest 
price at which an unfair product is available increases. In Section 5 we conduct a 
more thorough analysis of consumer’s choices and of the importance that consumers 
place on prices, i.e. on their own material payoff, versus the social impact of a 
product, i.e. the material payoff of the third party.  
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Figure 2. Prices by Product Type in Baseline Market Condition
 
 
Consumers’ concern for social impact is also reflected in a persistent price 
difference for the two types of products. Figure 2 shows the average purchase prices 
for the fair and unfair products over time. Two trends are clear from the figure. First, 
there is a general slight decreasing trend in prices over time. This is consistent with 
the competitive advantage held by buyers in this market, which is increasingly 
manifested in overall prices over time.17 Second, however, there is a persistent price 
difference for the two types of products. Products that produce no social harm cost 
more than socially harmful products throughout the experiment. This price premium 
increases over time, from 2.7 in the first six periods to 4.8 in the final six periods. 
By the end of the experiment, when the price premium is approximately 5 price 
units, the 10-unit cost of mitigating the externality is borne roughly equally by 
sellers and buyers. This is also illustrated by the solid line in Figure 3, which shows 
the price premium for the fair product—i.e., the mean price of the fair product minus 
the mean price of the unfair product—in the Market Baseline condition.  
As a complement to the above qualitative observations, Table 3 reports 
regressions that study how prices vary over time and by product type. Model 1 
reports estimates using data from the Market Baseline condition and reveals that the 
general price decrease across time is significant, that the fair product sells at a 
                                                            
17 In posted-offer markets, offer prices tend to be above equilibrium and convergence to the 
competitive equilibrium is slower compared to double-auction markets (Plot and Smith, 1978; 
Ketcham et al., 1984). Our market experiment reproduces this finding. Note that the trade volume 
corresponds, almost perfectly, to the equilibrium prediction—i.e., there are very few missed trading 
opportunities. Our High Firm Competition condition, which we analyze later, obtains prices closer to 
the competitive equilibrium prediction. A comparison between this condition and the Market 
Baseline provides a test how social responsibility is affected as price behavior converges further 
toward equilibrium.  
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significantly higher price, and that the gap between the two prices increases over 
time.  
 
Result 1: Outcomes in the Market Baseline condition reveal a significant and 
stable concern for the welfare of the third party, reflected both in market 
share and relative prices for the two kinds of products.  
 
Figure 3. Price Premium for the Fair Product across Varying Market Conditions
 
Table 3. Random-effects Regressions of Prices by Product Type 
Market 
Baseline 
High Firm 
Competition 
Limited Info. 
(Free) 
Limited Info. 
(Costly) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Period -0.283*** -0.474*** -0.574*** -0.342*** 
(0.037) (0.066) (0.051) (0.055) 
Fair Product 2.401*** 3.328*** 3.121*** 1.202 
(0.651) (0.846) (1.153) (0.934) 
Period X  0.108** 0.190** 0.192** 0.103* 
Fair Product (0.050) (0.079) (0.078) (0.062) 
Constant 26.881*** 21.812*** 28.771*** 30.240*** 
(0.574) (0.754) (0.791) (0.989) 
Observations 831 711 695 702 
# subjects 35 30 30 30 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4.2 Increased Firm Competition 
We next consider how the concern for social impact that we observe in the Market 
Baseline condition is affected by varying market characteristics. Our second market 
condition increases the number of firms, from 6 to 8, thereby increasing competition 
and likely putting downward pressure on prices. We use this condition to study how 
such increased competition and closer approximation to competitive equilibrium 
price levels affect the concern for social impact reflected in market outcomes. 
 Returning to Figure 1, the dotted line shows that the High Firm Competition 
condition yields a slightly higher frequency of fair products, relative to the Market 
Baseline. Specifically, the overall frequency of fair products traded increases from 
44 percent to 54 percent. Models 1 and 2 in Table 4 report the results of random-
effects probit regressions of the type of product purchased, comparing the Baseline 
Market and High Firm Competition conditions. Model 1 shows there to be no 
significant differences between the Market Baseline (omitted category) and High 
Firm Competition condition, in terms of overall fair product market shares over the 
course of the experiment. Model 2 additionally tests for differences in condition-
specific time trends, again revealing no significant treatment effects, neither in levels 
nor in time trends. Therefore, under increased firm competition, we observe 
persistent socially responsible behavior reflected in the market share of the fair 
product, which is slightly, but statistically insignificantly, higher than in the Market 
Baseline. 
  
Table 4. Random-effects Probit Regressions of Fair Consumer Product Choice in 
Market Baseline, Alternative Market Conditions, and No Market Treatment
 
Baseline vs.  
High Firm 
Competition  
Baseline vs. 
Limited Info  
(Free) 
Baseline vs. 
Limited Info  
(Costly) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Treatment 0.373 (0.359) 
0.494 
(0.333) 
-0.314 
(0.374) 
-0.471 
(0.378) 
-0.135 
(0.307) 
0.167 
(0.308) 
Period  
-0.007 
(0.008)  
-0.007 
(0.008)  
-0.007 
(0.008) 
Period X 
Treatment  
-0.010 
(0.013)  
0.013 
(0.016)  
-0.025 
(0.017) 
Constant -0.085 (0.230) 
-0.001 
(0.209) 
-0.083 
(0.232) 
0.002 
(0.211) 
-0.098 
(0.225) 
-0.014 
(0.204) 
Observations 1,542 1,542 1,526 1,526 1,533 1533 
# subjects 65 65 65 65 65 65 
Omits cases in which consumers made no product purchase
Robust standard errors (clustered by subject) in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We also observe the price premium for the fair product that we found in the 
Market Baseline condition. Figure 4 presents prices for the fair and unfair products, 
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in both the Market Baseline and High Firm Competition conditions. Reflecting basic 
economic forces, increased firm competition clearly has an effect on prices, with 
lower prices for both types of products than in the Market Baseline.  
 
Figure 4. Prices by Product Type in Baseline and High Competition Conditions
 
 
More importantly, for our purposes, the figure reveals that the price 
difference for the two types of products persists under High Firm Competition and, 
if anything, is slightly greater; this is also apparent in the dotted line in Figure 3. 
With prices converging toward the competitive equilibrium, the price premium of 
the fair product must eventually reflect the cost difference, if a firm wants to cover 
its cost of production. That is, in competitive equilibrium, where the price is zero for 
the unfair product, firms must charge a price premium of at least ten for the fair 
product—otherwise they are strictly worse off selling the fair product than not 
trading at all. This is one likely reason for why we might observe an increasing price 
premium for the fair product as the price for the unfair product decreases, i.e., 
relative to the Market Baseline condition. Importantly, however, many consumers 
are willing to pay the greater price premium for the fair product, which is revealed 
by the slightly increased market share for this product. Thus, despite market prices 
being closer to the competitive equilibrium prediction in the High Firm Competition 
condition, socially responsible behavior is not crowded out by increased 
competition.  
Returning to Table 3, in Model 2, we see that the lower prices with high 
competition are reflected in the smaller coefficient for the constant term, relative to 
the Market Baseline. We also observe the persistent price premium for fair products, 
reflected in the positive and significant coefficient for that variable and for the 
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interaction term with Period, both of which are higher under High Firm Competition 
than for the Market Baseline condition.18   
Result 2: Increased firm competition lowers prices relative to the Market 
Baseline, i.e. prices are closer to the competitive equilibrium prediction. 
Nevertheless, outcomes in the High Firm Competition condition reveal a 
significant and stable concern for the welfare of the third party, reflected 
both in market share and relative prices for the two kinds of products. 
Socially responsible behavior is even slightly, but statistically insignificantly, 
higher under High Firm Competition, relative to the Market Baseline.  
4.3 Limited Consumer Information 
We next analyze the case in which consumers initially possess limited information 
about the characteristics of the different available products. Specifically, while 
consumers always observe each product’s price, they are not initially informed about 
a product’s social impact, i.e., whether it is fair or unfair. However, they always 
have the opportunity to acquire such information. Our two Limited Information 
conditions vary whether such information is Free or Costly, in which case 
consumers must pay a small cost to become informed. 
The dashed lines in Figure 1 present the frequencies of fair product 
purchases in the two Limited Information conditions. Introducing Limited 
Information decreases the proportion of fair products traded, but only slightly. In 
particular, under Limited Information, the overall frequency of fair products traded 
across all periods decreases to about 40 percent, relative to 44 percent in the Market 
Baseline; this proportion, when considering all periods, is the same regardless of 
whether information is free or costly. Looking only at the second half of the 
experiment, where time trends are fairly flat, the frequencies of fair products are 
ordered in the manner one would expect—highest in the Market Baseline, then with 
Free Limited Information and lowest under Costly Limited Information—but with 
differences that are not very large in magnitude. 
To statistically test the effect of limited consumer information on product 
market shares, we return to the treatment-effect comparisons in Table 4. Models 3 to 
6 provide a comparison of the Market Baseline (omitted category) with the two 
Limited Information conditions. Models 3 and 5 show that there are no significant 
differences between fair product market shares in the Market Baseline and either of 
the two Limited Information conditions. Models 4 and 6 additionally show that there 
are also no significant differences in time trends. These results confirm that the 
                                                            
18 Nesting the regressions in Models 1 and 2 reveals that the effect of increased firm competition on 
overall price levels is significant: prices are significantly lower with High Firm Competition. The 
coefficients measuring the difference in price premiums between the Market Baseline and High Firm 
Competition conditions—i.e., High Firm Competition X Fair Product and High Firm Competition X 
Period X Fair Product—are both positive, but neither is statistically significant. However, as Figure 3 
and Table 3 indicate, the difference between the price premiums increases over time. Indeed, using 
this nested model to test the restriction that, after t periods, the two price premiums are statistically 
identical rejects equality in all periods, t ≥ 6. (More precisely, using the nested model, we test the 
restriction that, (High Firm Competition X Fair Product) + t * (High Firm Competition X Period X 
Fair Product) = 0, which is rejected at p < 0.05 (χ2(1) > 4.01) for t ≥ 6). 
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proportions of fair products are stable and quite similar between the Baseline Market 
and the two Limited Information conditions. 
The persistent concern for the welfare of the third party is again also 
reflected in the relative prices of the two types of products. The two dashed lines in 
Figure 3 show an increasing price premium for the fair product in both Limited 
Information conditions.19 Returning to Table 3, Models 3 and 4 present coefficient 
estimates for random-effects regressions of price on product type and across time for 
the two Limited Information conditions. The price premium for the fair product is 
statistically significant throughout the experiment and significantly increasing for 
Free Limited Information, reflecting an identical pattern to that in the Market 
Baseline. Under Costly Limited Information, the price premium increases 
significantly over time, but the overall difference only becomes statistically 
significant after a few periods.20 Thus, in both conditions with limited consumer 
information, we observe a persistent and statistically significant difference in the 
prices of the two types of products after the initial periods of the experiment.  
Result 3: Outcomes in both Limited Information conditions reveal a 
significant and stable concern for the welfare of the third party, reflected 
both in market shares and in relative prices for the two kinds of products. 
Relative to the Market Baseline, the concern for the welfare of the third party 
is slightly reduced, though not generally to statistically significant levels, 
when acquiring product information is costly. 
 In the Limited Information conditions, we can also study information 
acquisition decisions by consumers. Across the entire experiment, consumers in the 
Limited Information (Free) condition acquired information about product types 73 
percent of the time. Consistent with basic economic intuitions, consumers in the 
Limited Information (Costly) condition acquired this information less frequently, 42 
percent of the time. Note that this latter figure is close to the overall proportion of 
fair product purchases in the Limited Information (Costly) condition, 40 percent, 
suggesting that those consumers who acquire costly information use it to purchase 
fair products. The frequencies of information acquisition are also fairly stable across 
time.21  
Information acquisition appears instrumental, as reflected in Figure 5, which 
shows the type of product purchased, conditional on consumers’ information 
                                                            
19 Graphs showing price levels, separately, for the two types of products in the two Limited 
Information conditions are presented in the Appendix. We omit this figure here for space 
considerations. 
20 Specifically, statistical rejection of the condition that, Fair Product + t * Period X Fair Product = 
0, based on the estimates in Model 3, reaches a level of significance of p = 0.05 (χ2(1) = 3.77) in 
period t = 3. The weaker effect in the Limited Information (Costly) condition is consistent with the 
intuitive notion that prices are less likely to reflect product attributes when consumers are less well 
informed about such attributes. This is also consistent with our analysis, below, of consumers’ 
information acquisition decisions. 
21 If we consider all 8 three-period blocks, the frequencies vary between 66 percent and 79 percent in 
the Limited Information (Free) condition and between 36 and 47 percent in the Limited Information 
(Costly) condition. Moreover, random-effects probit regressions of information acquisition reveal no 
significant relationship with period in either condition. 
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acquisition decisions. In both Limited Information conditions, consumers who do 
not acquire information typically end up purchasing unfair products, particularly 
after the first few periods.22 Meanwhile, a large majority of consumers who pay for 
information purchase fair products (see the line labeled, “LI Costly – Info”), despite 
the fact that fair products are not always available. Not surprisingly, the proportion 
of consumers who acquire fair products following the acquisition of free information 
is lower—likely reflecting indifference between having and not having the 
information or curiosity without the intent to act on the obtained information.  
 
Figure 5. Product Purchases Conditional on Consumer Information Acquisition
 
 
Result 4: The frequency of information acquisition by consumers is generally 
stable over time and higher for free information than when information is 
costly. Consumers’ information acquisition appears instrumental, in that 
most consumers who acquire information purchase fair products (especially 
when it is costly), while those who do not acquire it almost always purchase 
unfair products. 
 
5. Individual Consumer and Firm Behavior 
Our analysis thus far has focused on aggregate market outcomes—product shares 
and prices—as a way of studying concern for the welfare of a non-participant in the 
market, potentially affected by a negative externality. Across all four market 
                                                            
22 While such consumers do not necessarily know which type of product they are purchasing, they 
almost always purchase the product available with the lowest price, which is typically an unfair 
product. 
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conditions, we find what appears to be a persistent concern for fairness; markets 
produce substantial quantities of the fair product and prices reflect a persistent, and 
often increasing, premium for these products that many consumers are willing to 
pay. 
 We next shift our attention from aggregate market outcomes to the individual 
behavior of consumers and firms. If market outcomes truly reflect socially 
responsible behavior, then such concerns should show up as part of a “sensible” 
dimension of the decision making of market participants. We first study the behavior 
of consumers across our experimental conditions, to observe whether they appear to 
value concern for the well being of the third party in a reasonable manner. 
Specifically, we ask whether the social impact of products can be described as a 
typical product attribute and incorporated into a standard model of consumer choice, 
and whether the apparent concern held by consumers for this attribute is similarly 
prevalent across different market conditions. We also explore the behavior of 
individual firms, to determine whether they respond to market conditions in a 
reasonable manner. Aside from providing insights into the preferences and decisions 
of consumers and firms, this analysis also helps us address the possible concern that 
the non-trivial market shares for the socially responsible product that we document 
earlier arise primarily from confusion or random behavior. 
 
5.1 Consumer behavior 
To study consumer behavior, we assume that individuals potentially care both about 
their own material payoff and about the social impact of their product choice—i.e., 
whether or not it produces an externality for the third party. A simple way to capture 
such preferences is with a linear utility function of the form, u = β x + γ y, where β 
represents the weight that consumers place on their own monetary payoff (value of 
the product minus the price paid), indicated by x, and γ captures their concern for 
their social responsibility toward the third party, whose payoff is indicated by y. 
Thus, for example, consumers with γ = 0 care only about buying the product at the 
lowest price, while consumers for whom 0 < αβ = γ are willing to sacrifice up to α 
units of own wealth for a one unit increase in the third party’s wealth. For simplicity, 
we assume that consumers do not care about the firm’s wealth.23 
 We estimate the weights in the above utility specification, using the 
conditional logit choice model specified by McFadden (1974). The model considers 
each of the K alternatives available to a buyer in a period (where, including the “no 
purchase” option, 3 ≤ K ≤ 7 in all conditions except for High Firm Competition, 
where 5 ≤ K ≤ 9) and uses the realized choices from each set of alternatives to 
                                                            
23 We do so for a couple of reasons. First, collinearity between consumer, firm and third party profits 
limits our ability to estimate linear model parameters if we include concern for the seller. Second, 
prior experimental evidence suggests that fairness between market participants is often extinguished 
in repeated market exchange (Kachelmeier, et al., 1991; Roth, et al., 1991; Francoisi, et al., 1995). 
Indeed, we confirm this to generally be the case in our data: when we conduct the estimation in Table 
5, replacing third party profits with firm profits, the weight on the firm’s profits is statistically 
significant at p < 0.05 only in the regression for the No Market condition (see Section 5). This likely 
reflects the feature of our design that the No Market condition is defined as a distributional choice 
between the decision maker and two other (passive) individuals, while the active role of sellers in the 
market context decreases the buyers’ concerns for the sellers’ payoffs, as in prior market experiments. 
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estimate weights on the two utility components, assuming extreme-value (logit) 
random utility errors.  
 Models 1–7 in Table 5 report the coefficient estimates for β and γ, both 
separately by condition and with condition-specific interaction terms to measure 
departures in β and γ from the Market Baseline.24 The estimated models also include 
case-specific variables identifying the propensity for subjects to make different 
choices (e.g., select the “no purchase” alternative) across periods and with varying 
individual characteristics—gender, age and university affiliation.25  
  
Table 5. Estimated Weights for Consumer Utility Model
 
Baseline 
Market 
High 
Firm 
Comp. 
Baseline 
& HF 
Comp. 
Limited 
Info 
(Free) 
Baseline 
& LI 
(Free) 
Limited 
Info 
(Costly)
Baseline 
& LI 
(Costly) 
No 
Market 
Baseline 
& No 
Market
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Consumer 
Earnings (β) 
0.372*** 
(0.062) 
0.385*** 
(0.090) 
0.420***
(0.057) 
0.422***
(0.057) 
0.414***
(0.049) 
0.574***
(0.100) 
0.452*** 
(0.060) 
0.307*** 
(0.053) 
0.389***
(0.047)
Third Party 
Earnings (γ) 
0.033*** 
(0.006) 
0.040*** 
(0.009) 
0.036***
(0.006) 
0.036***
(0.006) 
0.035***
(0.006) 
0.024***
(0.005) 
0.038*** 
(0.006) 
0.038*** 
(0.006) 
0.033***
(0.006)
Consumer X 
Treatment  
 -0.080
* 
(0.047)  
-0.028 
(0.033)  
0.000 
(0.054)  
-0.084**
(0.037)
Third Party 
X Treatment 
  0.000 (0.009)  
-0.002 
(0.009)  
-0.018** 
(0.008)  
0.005 
(0.008)
Observations 4,205 5,042 9,247 3,630 7,835 3,616 7,821 4,205 8,410 
Cases 840 720 1560 720 1560 720 1560 840 1680 
Robust standard errors (clustered by subject) in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The model includes period, gender, ln(age) and university affiliation as (unreported) case-specific 
(intercept) terms. 
 
Looking first at the condition-specific models (1, 2, 4, and 6), several 
patterns are apparent. First, consumers care both about their own monetary payoff (β 
> 0) and about the welfare of the third party (γ > 0). This is true in every condition, 
with both coefficients always highly statistically significant. Thus, the apparent 
                                                            
24 Specifically, Models 1, 2, 4, and 6 use only data from the relevant condition. Models 3, 5, and 7 
additionally include data from the Market Baseline; the “Treatment” interactions in these regressions 
identify deviations for the coefficients in that specific treatment condition from those estimated for 
the Market Baseline. 
25 The labeling of the different product options is irrelevant in our experiment (product choice options 
were unlabeled and were presented in random order), except for the option to not purchase a product 
in a period (which was always available). Therefore, we constrain the intercepts for all “purchase” 
decisions to be equal. The intercepts reveal that consumers tended to make the no-purchase option 
more frequently later in the experiment and as they reported an older age. As we saw earlier, 
however, selecting not to make a product purchase is generally infrequent. Omitting these intercept 
terms does not substantively change the results in the table. 
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social concern that we observe in aggregate market outcomes is also apparent in the 
individual behavior of consumers.  
The ratio of the two coefficients can be interpreted as the relative concern 
that consumers place on their own payoff versus the payoff of the third party. These 
ratios are generally fairly stable across conditions, ranging from 9.6 (High Firm 
Competition) to 11.7 (Limited Information (Free)), with the exception of Limited 
Information (Costly), where the ratio is much higher (23.9). Thus, when consumers 
have limited information about the social impact of their purchases and have to pay 
for such information, their purchasing behavior reflects decreased concern for the 
welfare of the third party.26 This decreased concern in the Limited Information 
(Costly) condition is also reflected in the negative and statistically significant 
coefficient for the interaction term, Third Party X Treatment, in Model 7.  
For the High Firm Competition condition (Models 2 and 3), the negative 
coefficient for the interaction term, Consumer X Treatment, in Model 3 reflects a 
decreased concern for own payoff, relative to that of the third party, with respect to 
the Market Baseline. Thus, our earlier observation that social responsibility appears 
to be slightly higher in this condition (see Figures 1 and 3) is also reflected in the 
behavior of individual consumers. 
Result 5: Consumer’s purchasing behavior reflects concern for both the 
price and the social impact of the product, in all market conditions. Social 
concern among consumers, relative to self-interest, is greater in the High 
Firm Competition condition and lower in the Limited Information (Costly) 
condition than in the Market Baseline condition. 
 
5.2 Firm behavior 
We also study the decisions made by individual firms regarding which type of 
product to produce in a period. Table 6 reports the results of random-effects probit 
regressions, using as the dependent variable whether a firm chose to offer a fair (1) 
or unfair (0) product in a period. The regressions include data from all four market 
conditions. 
The coefficients for the variable Period shows that there is no significant 
general time trend in the kinds of products offered by firms, in any specification. 
The variable, Offered Fair Productt-1,Firm, identifies whether the specific firm offered 
a fair product in the previous period. The positive and statistically significant 
coefficient suggests a tendency to repeat the product choice from the prior period. 
This is consistent with a firm-specific propensity to either offer fair or unfair 
products across periods; we document such firm-level heterogeneity more precisely 
in the next section. 
 
                                                            
26 In principle, it is possible to estimate a model that includes the endogenous information acquisition 
decision, incorporating the relevant cost. However, estimating such a model with our data requires 
making assumptions about the beliefs held by consumers regarding the characteristics of different 
products, based on observed prices. Given the necessarily ad hoc nature of such assumptions, we 
limit our analysis to a comparison of product purchases based on the known (to the experimenter) 
characteristics of products and ignore the (small) utility implications of information acquisition in the 
Limited Information (Costly) condition. 
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Table 6. Random-effects Probit Regressions of Firm Product Decisions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Period 0.003 (0.006) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
Offered Fair Productt-1,Firm 
0.365*** 
(0.118) 
0.479*** 
(0.125) 
0.490*** 
(0.126) 
0.310** 
(0.122) 
0.306*** 
(0.121) 
0.409*** 
(0.128) 
Unsold Fair Productt-1,Market  
-0.377*** 
(0.072) 
-0.250** 
(0.120)   
-0.313*** 
(0.074) 
Fair Product Price  
Premiumt-1,Market    
0.062*** 
(0.012) 
0.075*** 
(0.022) 
0.058*** 
(0.012) 
High Firm Competition 0.361 (0.358) 
0.385 
(0.354) 
0.581 
(0.365) 
0.283 
(0.358) 
0.133 
(0.394) 
0.309 
(0.355) 
Limited Information (Free) -0.294 (0.408) 
-0.337 
(0.403) 
-0.275 
(0.400) 
-0.256 
(0.407) 
-0.053 
(0.442) 
-0.303 
(0.403) 
Limited Information 
(Costly) 
-0.080 
(0.396) 
-0.102 
(0.391) 
-0.062 
(0.393) 
0.006 
(0.402) 
0.258 
(0.417) 
-0.019 
(0.396) 
Unsold Fair Productt-1 X  
High Firm Competition   
-0.394* 
(0.210)    
Unsold Fair Productt-1 X  
Limited Information (Free)   
-0.149 
(0.184)    
Unsold Fair Productt-1 X  
Limited Information 
(Costly)   
-0.086 
(0.185)    
Fair Product Price 
Premiumt-1 X 
High Firm Competition     
0.021 
(0.029)  
Fair Product Price 
Premiumt-1 X 
Limited Information (Free)     
-0.042 
(0.034)  
Fair Product Price 
Premiumt-1 X 
Limited Information 
(Costly) 
    
-0.080** 
(0.032)  
Constant -0.409 (0.291) 
-0.323 
(0.288) 
-0.391 
(0.290) 
-0.590** 
(0.294) 
-0.672** 
(0.309) 
-0.504* 
(0.291) 
Observations 
Number of subjects 
3,726 
162 
3,726 
162 
3,726 
162 
3,530 
162 
3,530 
162 
3,530 
162 
Robust standard errors (clustered by subject) in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The coefficients for the variable Period shows that there is no significant 
general time trend in the kinds of products offered by firms, in any specification. 
The variable, Offered Fair Productt-1,Firm, identifies whether the specific firm offered 
a fair product in the previous period. The positive and statistically significant 
coefficient suggests a tendency to repeat the product choice from the prior period. 
This is consistent with a firm-specific propensity to either offer fair or unfair 
products across periods; we document such firm-level heterogeneity more precisely 
in the next section. 
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 In Model 1, we also see that the binary variables identifying each treatment 
condition, relative to the Market Baseline, are never statistically significant. This is 
also the case in all other models. Thus, there is no general tendency toward more or 
less frequent fair product offers across the market conditions. 
 Models 2 and 3 introduce a variable, Unsold Fair Productt-1,Market, which 
identifies the proportion of unsold products in the market in the prior period that 
were fair products. For example, if only unfair products were unsold in the prior 
period this variable equaled 0, while if only fair products went unsold this variable 
equaled 1; the variable takes on intermediate values in all other cases.27 The negative 
and significant coefficients for this variable indicate that firms responded to past 
market outcomes—they were significantly less likely to offer a fair product if the 
products that were unsold in the prior period contained a greater proportion of fair 
products. When Model 3 introduces interactions with the different market 
conditions, we see that this effect is strongest in the High Firm Competition 
condition. This is natural, given that the increased competition in that treatment 
likely led firms to be more concerned with whether their product offer would not be 
purchased. 
 Models 4 and 5 introduce another variable identifying lagged market 
outcomes. The variable, Fair Product Price Premiumt-1,Market, identifies the 
difference between the mean price for fair products and that for unfair products 
purchased in the prior period.28 The positive and significant coefficients for this 
variable indicate that firms respond to the lagged price difference, becoming more 
likely to offer a fair product when these sold at a higher premium in the prior period. 
The treatment interactions reveal no significant difference for the Limited 
Information (Free) condition or for the High Firm Competition condition. However, 
the relationship between lagged price premium and product type decisions is 
significantly weaker when product information is costly for consumers.29  
 Finally, Model 6 incorporates both of the above lagged market variables 
simultaneously. Both the types of unsold products and the price premium in the 
previous period continue to have an effect when studied together. 
Result 6: Firm’s product offer decisions are generally responsive to market 
conditions. Firms offer more fair products when such products previously 
sold at a higher price and were less likely to remain unsold. 
 
                                                            
27 Recall that, in most conditions, there was at least one unsold product in every period, while in the 
High Firm Competition condition there were at least three. There were more in the few cases in 
which a consumer did not buy a product. We construct this variable so that it is always between 0 and 
1, as it measures the proportion of unsold products that were fair. 
28 Specifically, we calculated the mean price for all fair products purchased by consumers in the prior 
period, and did the same for all purchased unfair products, and subtracted the latter from the former. 
We omit cases in which at least one type of each product was not purchased. 
29 We speculate that this might reflect a generally weaker relationship between prices and product 
types when consumers have limited information. To explore this possibility, we compute the 
correlations between the prices and product types separately for each treatment condition. We indeed 
find that the correlation is higher in the two experimental conditions without limited consumer 
information (Market Baseline: r = 0.50; High Firm Competition: r = 0.52) than in those with (Limited 
Info. Free: r = 0.39; Limited Info. Costly: r = 0.38). 
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5.3 Consumer and Firm Heterogeneity 
The above results indicate a considerable influence of concerns for social 
responsibility in average individual market behavior by consumers and firms. Of 
course, these results hide potentially significant individual differences in concerns 
for social impact. Indeed, individual choice experiments—e.g., using dictator 
games—usually reveal heterogeneous concerns for fairness by individuals (Camerer, 
2003; Engel, 2011). 
Figure 6 presents histograms showing, separately, how often each consumer 
purchased or each firm offered a fair product, pooling the individual’s decisions 
across periods. We present here only the data for the Market Baseline condition.30 
The top two panels, A and B, show the individual behavior of buyers and sellers, 
respectively, over the entire experiment; the bottom two panels, C and D, do so for 
only the second half of the experiment (periods 13-24). For consumers, we consider 
only those periods in which the consumer had a choice between at least one fair and 
one unfair product. 
 
Figure 6. Distributions of Individual Behavior (Market Baseline)
 
Looking first at the entire experiment, in Panels A and B, we see 
considerable heterogeneity in the behavior of both consumers and firms. For 
example, while some consumers (6 percent) never purchase a fair product, a larger 
proportion (14 percent) does so in every period. A similar pattern obtains for firms: a 
smaller proportion (12 percent) never offers a fair product than those who always do 
so (19 percent). Moreover, while in both graphs there is mass at the extremes, the 
                                                            
30 Comparable graphs for all other market conditions are provided in the Appendix, see Figures A2 – 
A4. The distributions are qualitatively similar across all conditions. 
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majority of subjects lie in between—purchasing or offering both kinds of products 
over the course of the experiment. 
In the second half of the experiment, in Panels C and D, there is clearly 
greater differentiation in the behavior of both firms and consumers. Among 
consumers, the proportion that never purchase the fair product increases to 23 
percent, while the proportion who always do so is even higher (29 percent). For 
firms, the proportions are similar: 24 percent never offer the fair product, while 26 
percent always do so. Thus, for both consumers and firms, behavior in the second 
half of the experiment reflects both high degrees of heterogeneity and fairly strong 
invariance in individual behavior. Some firms and consumers, roughly half, either 
always offer or purchase the fair product or never do so. This finding is similar 
across all market conditions (see Appendix). This supports the idea that the socially 
responsible outcomes that we observe in aggregate market outcomes are the product 
of heterogeneous individual concerns for fairness and social impact held by market 
participants, comparable to the heterogeneity observed in individual choice 
experiments. 
Result 7: Individual consumer and firm behavior in the market reflect 
heterogeneous and somewhat stable concerns for the third party. 
 
6. Market Consumer Behavior versus Individual Non-Market 
Choices 
The analysis so far clearly shows that socially responsible behavior is not eliminated 
by repeated market interactions. Instead, we document a stable concern for social 
impact, represented in market shares, prices and individual consumer and firm 
behavior. To study whether the level of social concern exhibited in our markets is 
comparable to that in non-market individual choice contexts, we compare the 
choices of consumers in our Market Baseline condition with consequentially almost 
identical choices faced by individuals in our No Market condition. This latter 
condition mimics distributional decision tasks, such as the dictator game, typically 
used to measure fairness in individual choice experiments.  
Our design allows a direct comparison between the choices made by 
consumers in the Market Baseline condition and by a comparable group of subjects 
in the No Market condition. Recall from the experimental design in Section 2 that 
we created the No Market condition by taking the 24 product choice sets facing each 
of the consumers in the Market Baseline condition, and presenting these exact 24 
choices—with identical monetary consequences for a set of three subjects—to other 
subjects in the No Market condition. Thus, from a purely monetary point of view, 
the 24 choice sets faced by one subject in the No Market condition are identical to 
the 24 choices sets faced by a consumer in the Market Baseline. 
 The dashed line in Figure 7 shows the proportion of “fair” choices—i.e., 
choices that imposed no “externality” on the “third party”—made by consumers in 
the No Market condition. The solid line shows the comparable proportion in the 
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Market Baseline (as in Figure 1).31 Consistent with the idea that markets diminish 
socially responsible or moral behavior (e.g., Falk and Szech, 2013), the proportion 
of fair choices is higher in the No Market condition relative to the Market Baseline. 
However, the difference is not very large: 44.3 percent vs. 53.8 percent. Moreover, 
as the random-effects probit regressions reported in Models 1 and 2 in Table 7 
reveal, the differences in proportions do not differ significantly, neither in levels, as 
indicated by the coefficient for No Market, nor in trends across time.  
  
Figure 7. Fair Product Purchases in Baseline Market and No Market Conditions
 
 
We can also compare the distributions of the individual behavior of subjects 
in the No Market condition and of consumers in the Market Baseline, across the 
experiment. For this purpose, we return to the individual-specific measures of 
frequency of fair choices, reported in Figure 6. Figure 8 shows the analogous 
cumulative frequencies of subject behavior for buyers in both the Market Baseline 
(the same data as in Figure 6, Panel A, transformed into a cumulative density) and 
for decision makers in the No Market condition. Comparing individual behavior 
leads to a similar conclusion as the one we draw above. The comparison suggests 
slightly less fair behavior in the Market Baseline than under No Market. For 
example, the cumulative frequency for the Market Baseline is almost always higher 
than for the No Market condition, reflecting a tendency toward less frequent fair 
                                                            
31 For comparability with the Market Baseline condition, where we omitted cases in which a 
consumer did not purchase a product, we omit cases in the No Market condition in which a subject 
made the analogous choice. While such choices could be interpreted as exhibiting a high concern for 
equality (since they yield payoffs of 100 for all parties), they are inefficient and also infrequent in the 
No Market condition (3 percent of cases). Including such choices in both the Market Baseline and No 
Market condition has no substantive effect on the results. 
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behavior by market consumers. Moreover, there are roughly twice as many subjects 
in the No Market condition who always chose fairly than in the Market Baseline 
(14.3 vs. 28.5 percent). However, as with the analysis in Table 7, statistical 
comparisons of the distributions yield insignificant differences (Kolmogorov-
Smirnov: D35,35 = 0.26, p = 0.20; Wilcoxon rank-sum: z = 1.10, p = 0.27).32  
 
Figure 8. Cumulative Frequencies of Individual Socially Responsible Behavior
 
 
 Returning to the utility specification in Section 4.1 and the respective 
conditional logit model, Models 8 and 9 in Table 5 allow comparisons of consumer 
and individual preferences, between the No Market and Market Baseline conditions, 
similar to those we made earlier for the different market conditions. Model 8 reveals 
that subjects in the No Market condition care both about their own monetary payoff 
(β > 0) and about the welfare of the third party (γ > 0), with both coefficients highly 
statistically significant. The ratio of the two coefficients, which can be interpreted as 
the relative concern that subjects place on their own payoff versus the payoff of the 
“third party” (Player C), is lower in the No Market condition (8.1) than in the 
Market Baseline (11.3). This difference is also reflected in the negative and 
statistically significant coefficient for the interaction term, Consumer X Treatment, 
in Model 9. Thus, the observation that market fairness is lower than the fairness 
                                                            
32 These statistical comparisons treat the observations as independent between conditions. However, 
the nature of the data is such that the choices presented to subjects are paired—each subject in the No 
Market condition is presented with the same choices as a buyer in the Market Baseline. This allows 
us to conduct a paired comparison of how behavior changes between conditions, when holding 
constant the choice set. This analysis similarly finds no significant difference between conditions (t34 
= 1.12, p = 0.27; sign test: p = 0.38). 
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observed in the No Market condition is significant when we analyze the behavior of 
individual consumers. 
 
Table 7. Random-effects Probit Regressions of Fair Choices in the No Market 
Condition and Fair Product Purchases in the Market Baseline
  (1) (2) 
No Market 0.330 0.314 
(0.321) (0.302) 
Period  -0.007 
  (0.008) 
Period X No Market 0.001 
(0.012) 
Constant -0.091 -0.008 
(0.227) (0.206) 
Observations 1,643 1,643 
Number of subjects 70 70 
Omits cases in which consumer made no product purchase and the respective choices in 
No Market condition 
Robust standard errors (clustered by subject) in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Result 8: Socially responsible behavior is slightly—though not always 
statistically significantly—more prevalent in the No Market than in the 
Market Baseline condition. 
 Thus, we find, in contrast to other recent work (e.g., Falk and Szech, 2013), 
that social responsibility in our market setting is only slightly lower than that in non-
market contexts. A nice feature of our design is that we create almost identical 
paired choices—in terms of the procedures of making a choice and the monetary 
consequences—confronting market consumers and individual non-market decision 
makers. This procedure allows a direct comparison between market and non-market 
behavior, while holding many aspects of the choice constant.33 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper provides experimental evidence addressing the question of whether 
concerns for social responsibility persist in repeated market interaction. To this end, 
we develop and experimentally study a laboratory product market, in which socially 
responsible behavior involves incurring additional production costs to mitigate a 
potential negative externality imposed on a non-market participant. We find strong 
                                                            
33 Of course, there are nevertheless numerous differences between our market and non-market choice 
contexts, which may be responsible for the slight differences we observe. As with similar prior work, 
in this paper we do not attempt to study which of many possible varying factors might be responsible 
for differences between market and non-market pro-social behavior, though we discuss some of these 
factors in the next section. 
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evidence that socially responsible behavior is consistent with market exchange, and 
that repeated market experience does not erode such concerns.  
Our data show, first, that there is a substantial and constant share of socially 
responsible products supplied and demanded in all our market conditions. Second, 
the socially responsible product, which avoids imposing a negative externality on a 
third party but costs more to produce, sells at a price premium that does not decrease 
with market experience. In some cases, this price premium even increases over time, 
suggesting that the consumers’ willingness to pay in order to behave in a socially 
responsible way is not eliminated, but is rather heightened, over the course of the 
repeated market interaction. Third, we show that individual-level behavior is 
consistent with a preference for acting socially responsibly, though such concerns 
are heterogeneous. Finally, we show that a direct comparison between market and 
non-market behavior reveals the latter to be only slightly more concerned with social 
impact. Thus, to summarize, we find that social concerns are manifested in markets, 
that they are persistent and robust, and that they are comparable to the degree of 
social concern elicited through direct individual choice. 
Aside from demonstrating the presence of social responsibility in markets, 
we also document its robustness to varying market conditions. We show that 
socially conscious behavior persists despite high levels of firm competition and 
limited consumer information. Of course, there are many possible alternative market 
characteristics that may impact the degree of socially responsible behavior, and our 
design easily lends itself to further study in this regard. In our case, we selected two 
features—increased competition and limited information —that have been shown to 
influence the manifestation of social concerns in prior work (Roth, et al., 1991; 
Dana, et al., 2007). Indeed, as in prior work, increased competition in our 
experiment decreases the equitable distribution of surplus between firms and 
consumers—that is, it pushes prices closer toward the competitive equilibrium 
outcome. However, the impacts on social concern toward the non-market third party 
are small and, if anything, the degree of concern revealed by market behavior 
increases with stronger competition. 
Our results complement and counterbalance recent propositions and 
empirical findings that markets erode moral values. Our data do not reject the 
possibility that market interaction may reduce the prevalence of socially responsible 
behavior. Instead, we provide a clear example of where, in four different variants of 
a market, social concerns are prevalent and stable over time and only slightly lower 
than in comparable non-market decisions. Our results, therefore, draw attention to 
the important challenge of understanding better the conditions under which markets 
erode moral values—or even maybe the conditions under which they increase 
them—rather than making claims that they generally do or do not. 
Where markets do exert influence on socially responsible behavior, it is also 
important to understand what factors are responsible. Many things differ between 
individual choices and market decisions. These include diffusion of responsibility 
between market participants, the use of contextually rich terms like “prices,” 
“profit,” and “selling” in market contexts, and strategic motives and opportunities 
for social learning that may be present in market interaction but absent in individual 
choice. Some of these features may be inherent to the distinction between market 
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behavior and individual choice. Hence, both our experiment and similar previous 
work that compares market and non-market behavior necessarily varies multiple 
characteristics at once. However, our design controls for other potential differences, 
such as the precise choice sets offered to decision makers, the degree of interaction 
between market participants and the duration of repetition, which are not accounted 
for in similar prior studies.34 
Another critical difference between our market experiment and other prior 
work is that we allow the presence of a technology that can mitigate the externality, 
at a cost to market participants. The prevalence of such technologies is widespread 
in most existing markets. For example, “green,” “fair trade,” “ethical sourcing,” and 
“cruelty-free” production are features of many products, which often involve higher 
costs that must be borne in some combination by firms and consumers. But, such 
products are nevertheless often visible in the market. It is natural, therefore, to study 
social responsibility in the presence of such technologies. In this sense, our design 
allows social responsibility to be consistent with market exchange, rather than 
entirely orthogonal, as in some prior work. Our design also lends itself to variations 
that study alternative technologies, to understand how these influence the prevalence 
of socially responsible market behavior.35 
Much more work is required to understand better the conditions under which 
markets will reflect concerns for social responsibility, and “morality.” To this end, 
one of our contributions is what we believe to be a valuable experimental paradigm. 
As we note earlier, our design is easily modified to incorporate varying and possibly 
heterogeneous production technologies or market characteristics. It is also 
straightforward to incorporate additional realistic features like firm reputation, 
products with greater heterogeneity in social impact, and market regulations, which 
we intentionally omit from our current experiment with the goal of simplicity. All of 
these possibilities raise interesting questions and topics for future research.  
  
                                                            
34 For example, Falk and Szech’s (2013) comparison between market and non-market choice contexts 
compares an interactive, repeated, double-auction, bargaining context with a one-shot individual 
choice setting involving different kinds of choices. In our comparison, consumers and decision 
makers are always presented with the same choice menus—in both market and non-market 
contexts—repeated the same number of times, and do not otherwise interact with sellers in the market 
case.  
35 Evidence that socially responsible market behavior is robust to alternative market characteristics 
and production technologies can be seen in a recent working paper by Danz, et al. (2012), which 
studies whether consumers with monopsony power in a duopoly market setting are willing to pay 
more for products produced by firms that pay higher wages to their workers. They find that a 
substantial proportion of consumers buy a higher-priced product if it also yields a higher wage for the 
worker. The specific focus of their paper is on how such concern by consumers is affected by 
variations in minimum wage policies. 
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Appendix A: Social Responsibility Modeled as Inequity Aversion  
In this appendix, we apply a widely used model of social preferences—the model of 
inequity aversion of Fehr and Schmidt (1999)—to our experimental setting and 
show conditions under which a single firm and a single consumer would prefer 
trading the fair product over trading the unfair product. Thus, we provide an 
illustrative example of how the model of inequity aversion can be used to account 
for socially responsible behavior in markets.    
Suppose a consumer cares not only about her own monetary payoff but also 
about the payoff of the matched third party. More precisely, an inequity-averse 
consumer experiences disutility equal to	β � � times the (positive) difference 
between her own payoff and that of the third party, in addition to the utility 
produced by her own payoff. (For simplicity we assume for the moment that the 
consumer does not care about the firm’s payoff.) For given prices, p� � �0 for the 
fair product and p� � �0 for the unfair product, the consumer prefers buying the fair 
product over buying the unfair product if, 
 
U�fair� � ��0 � p� � β���0 � p� � �00� � ��0 � p� � β���0 � p� � �0�
� U�unfair� 
 � �p � p� � p� � 60β� � β (1)
 
that is, if the price premium for the fair product does not exceed the r.h.s. of (1), 
which is increasing in the degree, β � �, of aversion to favorable inequity. 
Next, suppose a firm cares not only about its own monetary payoff but also 
about the payoff of the third party, again in proportion to some weight placed on 
advantageous inequity, β � �. (For simplicity we also assume, for the moment, that 
the firm does not care about the consumer’s payoff.) The firm prefers selling the fair 
product at a price	p� � �0 (ensuring that the firm is never worse off than the third 
party) over selling the unfair product if, 
  
Π�fair� � �0 � p� � β��0 � p� � �00� � �00 � p� � β��00 � p� � �0�
� Π�unfair� 
 � �p � p� � p� � �0 � �0β� � β  (2)
 
that is, if the price premium for the fair product is as least as high as the r.h.s. of (2), 
which is decreasing in the degree, β � �, of favorable inequity aversion. 
Assume further that both firm and consumer have the same degree, β, of 
inequity aversion. It then follows from (1) and (2) that if β � ����, the consumer’s 
willingness to pay for the fair product is as least as high as the firm’s required price 
premium. In such cases, there will always be a price premium such that both parties 
prefer, at least weakly, trading the fair product. If β � ����, the price premium will 
be exactly 5, and if β � ����, different price premiums are possible, where either 
firm or consumer bear a larger share of the additional cost of 10. If β � ���, it is 
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possible that either the firm or the consumer bears the entire additional production 
cost, i.e. all price premiums between 0 and 10 are possible. The left panel of Figure 
A1 provides an illustration. 
If firms and consumers also care about each other’s payoffs, conditions (1) 
and (2) become, respectively, 
 
 �p � p� � p� � 25β
1 � 32 β
 
 
(1’)
 �p � p� � p� � 1� � 5α � 35β
1 � α � 12β
 
(2’)
 
where, for simplicity, we impose the restriction (which is borne out in our data) that 
1� � 	p� � 3� and 	p� � 25, i.e., the firm is not better off than the consumer but 
also not worse off than the third party. The parameter, �, captures the degree of 
aversion to unfavorable inequity. 
Condition (2’) reveals that a firm with α � �, would now be willing to offer 
the fair product at a price premium of less than 10 (but always more than 5) even if 
β � �. The reason is that the higher price of the fair product reduces the payoff of 
the consumer by more (by the price premium) than it reduces the payoff of the firm 
(by 10 minus the price premium). Recall that both types of the product are worth 50 
to the consumer, and that the production cost of the fair product is 10 units higher 
than the production cost of the unfair product. Thus, a price premium larger than 5 
decreases the unfavorable inequity of the firm towards the consumer. This is 
illustrated in the right panel of Figure A1.  
Assume again that both firm and consumer have the same degree of inequity 
aversion, β. (Note that α is irrelevant for the consumer, who is better off than both 
firm and third party.) It then follows from (1’) and (2’) that if β � 2/13, the 
consumer’s willingness to pay for the fair product is as least as high as the firm’s 
required price premium. Hence, there will always be a price premium such that both 
parties prefer, at least weakly, trading the fair product. The price premium will be 
exactly 5 if β � 2/13. Note that at a price premium of exactly 5, the payoff 
difference between the firm and the consumer is independent of the type of the 
product that is traded. Note that the cutoff-value, β � 2/13, is exactly twice as large 
as the cutoff value in the case where social comparisons are made only towards the 
third party. The doubled threshold is due to the fact that the weight of the third party 
in the firm’s and the consumer’s social comparison term is reduced to β/2 in the 
Fehr-Schmidt model. Moreover, for a price premium of exactly 5, where firm and 
consumer share the additional production costs equally, the preference parameter α 
is irrelevant for the product type choice and thus does not affect the threshold value 
for β. If β � 2/13, different price premiums are possible, where either firm or 
consumer bear a larger share of the additional cost of 10. A consumer would now be 
willing to bear the entire extra cost of the fair product only if β � 1/�. Again, the 
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higher threshold is due to the reduced weight of the third party in the consumer’s 
social comparison term. If ? ? ??? ? ??????, the firm would be willing to bear the 
entire additional production cost, i.e. all price premiums between 0 and 10 are then 
possible. The right panel shows this situation for ? ? ?, where the firm’s cut-off 
value is given by ? ? ???.  
 
Figure A1. Price Premiums as Functions of the Inequity Aversion Parameter??
Pr
ic
e 
Pr
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m
 
 Left panel:  
Comparisons with third party only  
 
Right panel:  
Multilateral comparisons 
 
Notes: The left panel considers the case where firms and consumers compare their 
payoffs only to the third party. It shows the minimal price premium that a firm 
demands in order to offer the fair product instead of the unfair product type 
(decreasing line) and the maximal price premium that a consumer is willing to pay 
for the fair product (increasing line), both as a function of the degree of favorable 
inequity aversion (?). The right panel considers the case where social comparisons 
also include the respective other trading party. The decreasing curve for the firm is 
drawn for ? ? ?. Increasing (lowering) the values of ? leads to a left (right) rotation 
of the curve around the intersection of the two curves.  
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Appendix B: Additional Figures
Figure A2: Prices by Product Type in the Limited Information Conditions
Figure A3: Distributions of Individual Behavior (High Firm Competition)
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Figure A4: Distributions of Individual Behavior (Hidden Information Free)
Figure A5: Distributions of Individual Behavior (Hidden Information Costly)
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Appendix C: Experimental Instructions 
A) Market Baseline 
 
General instructions 
 
 
We are pleased to welcome you to this economic study. 
 
If you read the following instructions carefully, you can – depending on your 
decisions and/or those of the other participants – earn money in addition to the 15
Swiss francs that you receive as an initial endowment for participating. It is thus 
very important that you read the instructions carefully. If you have any questions, 
please contact us.  
Communication with the other participants is strictly forbidden during the 
study. Violation of this rule will lead to exclusion from the study and loss of all of 
the associated payments. 
During the study, we will not speak of francs, but of points. Your entire income will 
thus first be calculated in points. The points you earn during the study will be 
converted to Swiss francs at the end of the study. The following conversion rate 
applies: 
10 points = 2.50 Swiss francs. 
At the end of today’s study, you will receive the number of points earned during the 
study plus the initial endowment of 15 Swiss francs for appearing in cash. 
We will explain the exact procedure of the study on the next pages. For the sake of 
simplicity, we will always use male forms for participants; the instructions also 
obviously refer to female participants. 
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The study 
There are three types of participants in this study: participants A, B, and C. The 
participants in this study are divided into groups of 16 people. There are 6 
participants A, 5 participants B, and 5 participants C in each group.  
Participants A are sellers, participants B are buyers. Participants C can neither 
sell nor buy, but they can incur losses due to the transactions between the 
participants A and B. 
The study last for 24 periods. In each period, each participant A makes exactly one 
sales offer for a product. Participant A thus determines the type of product and the 
price for the product. 
 There are two types of products: 
1. “Products with no effect on participant C” and 
2. “Products with a loss for participant C”. 
 Every value from 0 up to and including 50 can be selected as a price. 
The production costs for participants A for a “product with no effect on participant 
C” amount to 10 points. Participant A bears no costs (0 points) for the production of 
a “product with a loss for participant C”.  
The value of a product for a participant B is always 50 points, regardless of what 
type of product it is. 
The five participants B see the sales offers made by the six participants A (the price 
and the type of product) and can accept one offer each. The participants B can 
decide one after the other in a random order. Each participant B can only accept one 
offer. This means that a maximum of five of the six participants A can sell a 
product. 
In each period, each of the five participants B will be randomly assigned to one of 
the five participants C. If a participant B purchases a “product with a loss for 
participant C”, the assigned participant C incurs a loss of 60 points. If a participant 
B purchases a “product with no effect on participant C” or no product at all, the 
assigned participant C incurs no loss. 
You will see whether you are participant A, B, or C on your screen at the 
beginning of the study. Your role as participant A, B, or C remains the same 
during the entire study. 
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In each period, each participant A, B, and C first receives an endowment of 100 
points. The payment in points of participant A (seller), participant B (buyer), and 
participant C in a period are thus determined as follows: 
Participant A’s payment 
 If a participant B accepts his sales offer 
100 – costs of production + price of the product
where the production cost amounting to 10 points are incurred only with a 
“product without effect on participant C”. The production costs for a 
“product with a loss for participant C amount to 0. 
 If no participant B accepts his sales offer: 100 
Participant B’s payment: 
 If participant B accepts a sales offer 
100 + 50 – price of the product
 If participant B does not accept a sales offer: 100 
Participant C’s payment: 
 If the randomly assigned participant B chooses a “Product with loss for 
participant C” 
100 - 60
 If the randomly assigned participant B chooses a “Product without effect on 
participant C” or does not purchase a product: 100 
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Procedures on the computer: 
In each period, participants A enter their sales offers on the following screen: 
 
Participant A must indicate whether he wants to offer a “product without effect on 
participant C” or a “product with a loss for participant C.” to do this, the 
corresponding type of product must be clicked on. 
Furthermore, participant A must indicate the price he wants to request for the 
product. The corresponding number must be entered in the box. All integers from 0 
up to and including 50 are possible. 
Once a participant A has made his decisions, he must click on the OK button at the 
lower right-hand side. The type of product and the price can be changed until the 
OK button is clicked. 
Once all six participants A have made their sales offers, the participants A will see 
the sales offers (the price and the type of product) of all of the other participants A in 
a table. Here is an example: 
 
 
The participant’s own sales offer is always marked in blue. Participants A can 
always see in the column on the right whether and in which order the participants B 
accept the offers. 
Once all participants B have made their decisions, each participant A will learn of 
his own payment and – if his offer is accepted – participant B’s payment and the 
payment of the corresponding participant C.  
This is where the participants A 
see the type of product for 
every sales offer 
This is where the participants A 
see the price of the product for 
every sales offer 
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The participants B can see the sales offers on the screen below in each period:  
 
Participants B see the screen above in a random order and can accept an offer one 
after the other. Thus only one participant B sees the screen above at any one point in 
time. Only when the current participant B has made his decisions will the next 
participant B see the screen above, where he can then accept an offer. 
The participant B who is first shown the screen can select from all offers. The 
participant B who is shown the screen second can only choose from the remaining 
offers, as each offer can only be accepted by one participant B. 
If the five participants B have each accepted an offer, one offer will always remain 
that can no longer be accepted. The participant A who made this offer cannot 
conclude a sale in this period. 
The order in which the five participants B decide on accepting the six offers will be 
randomly determined anew in each period. 
The prices appear in the left column of the table, and the type of product appears in 
the right column. Each offer is always in a separate row. In order to accept an offer, 
the corresponding row must be clicked on with the mouse. The marked row will then 
appear with a blue background.  
 In order to accept the offer marked in blue, you must click on the ACCEPT 
button. 
The choice of offer can be changed until the ACCEPT button is clicked on. 
If a participant B does not want to accept an offer, he must click on the DO NOT 
ACCEPT AN OFFER button. Even if a row had already been marked, all offers will 
be declined if the DO NOT ACCEPT AN OFFER is clicked on. 
When all participants B have made their decisions, each participant B will learn of 
his own payment and that of his assigned participant C.  
This is where the participants B 
see the type of product for every 
sales offer 
This is where the participants B 
see the price of the product for 
every sales offer 
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Participants C cannot make any decisions during this study. We ask the participants 
C, however, to indicate in each period their expectations about the behaviors of 
participants A and B. 
When all participants A and B have made their decisions, the participants C will 
learn of their own earnings, which are entirely dependent on the decisions of 
participants A and B. 
After all participants have been informed about their payments in a period, the next 
period will begin.  
Your earnings in this study are the payment out of one randomly selected 
period.
Because you do not know which period the computer will randomly select, you 
must consider your decisions in each of the 24 periods very carefully. 
At the end of the study, the corresponding point amount will be converted to 
Swiss francs and paid in cash to you together with the initial endowment. 
Do you have any further questions? If yes, please raise your hand. We will come to 
you at your workplace. Otherwise, we ask you to answer the control questions on the 
next pages. 
Control questions 
1. Assume that participant A offers a “product without effect on participant C” at 
the price of 40 and participant B accepts the offer.  
How high are the payments to participants A and B and the corresponding 
participant C? 
2. Assume that participant A offers a “product with a loss for participant C” at the 
price of 40 and participant B accepts the offer. 
How high are the payments to participants A and B and the corresponding 
participant C? 
3. Assume that participant A offers a “product without effect on participant C” at 
the price of 15 and participant B accepts the offer. 
How high are the payments to participants A and B and the corresponding 
participant C? 
4. Assume that participant A offers a “product with a loss for participant C” at the 
price of 15 and no participant B accepts the offer. 
How high is the payment for participant A? How high is the payment for a 
participant B who does not accept an offer? How high is the payment for the 
corresponding participant C? 
Please raise your hand when you have completed the control questions. We will then 
come to you at your workplace.  
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B) No Market Condition 
[General instructions as in Market Baseline]  
 
The study 
There are three types of participants in this study: participants A, B, and C. The 
participants in this study are divided into groups of 3 people. There is one participant 
A, one participant B, and one participant C in each group.  
The study last for 24 periods. In each period, one participant A, one participant B, 
and one participant C are randomly assigned to one another. 
In each period, the participants A, B, and C first receive an endowment of 100 
points. 
The Participant B in a group can select a different distribution of points. In case 
of a new distribution, the sum of the payments that participants A and B receive is 
40 or 50 points greater than the initial endowment of 100 points each.  
There are two types of distributions: 
3. “Distribution with no effect on participant C” and 
4. “Distribution with a loss for participant C”. 
If a participant B selects a “distribution with no effect on participant C,” the 
assigned participant C incurs a loss of 60 points. If a participant B selects a 
“distribution with no effect on participant C” or does not opt for a new distribution, 
the assigned participant C will not incur any loss. 
You will see whether you are participant A, B, or C on your screen at the 
beginning of the study. Your role as participant A, B, or C remains the same 
during the entire study. 
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In each period, each participant A, B, and C first receives an endowment of 100 
points. The payment in points of participant A, B, and C in a period depend on the 
participant B’s decisions and are determined as follows: 
Participant A’s payment 
 If the randomly assigned participant B selects a new distribution 
Payment in the new distribution 
 If the participant B does not select a new distribution: 100 
Participant B’s payment: 
 If he selects a new distribution 
Payment in the new distribution  
 If he does not select a new distribution: 100 
Participant C’s payment: 
 If the randomly assigned participant B chooses a “Distribution with loss for 
participant C” 
100 - 60 = 40 
 If the randomly assigned participant B chooses a “Distribution without effect 
on participant C” or does not select a new distribution: 100 
 
In case of a “distribution without effect on Participant C,” the sum of the payments 
for participant A and participant B is 40 points higher than if no new distribution is 
chosen, for example 125 points for participant A and 115 points for participant B 
(and 100 points for participant C). 
In case of a “distribution with a loss for Participant C,” the sum of the payments for 
participant A and participant B is 50 points higher than if no new distribution is 
chosen, for example 120 points for participant A and 130 points for participant B 
(and 100 – 60 = 40 points for participant C). 
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Procedures on the computer: 
In each period, participants B can select from possible new distributions on the 
following screen: 
  
Participants B can choose from two to six different distributions in each period. In 
this case, for example, participant B can choose between five new, different 
distributions. 
The left column of the table shows the possible payments for participant A, the 
middle column shows the possible payments for participant B, and the type of 
distribution is shown in the right column. Each new distribution always appears in a 
separate row. In order to select a new distribution, the box at the far right must be 
clicked on with the mouse.  
 The SELECT button must be clicked on in order to select the chosen 
distribution. 
The type of distribution can be changed until the SELECT button is clicked. 
If a participant B does not want to select a new distribution, he must press the DO 
NOT SELECT A DIFFERENT DISTRIBUTION button. Even if new distribution 
had already been marked, no new distribution will be selected if the DO NOT 
SELECT A DIFFERENT DISTRIBUTION button is chosen. 
When all participants B have made their decisions, the assigned participants A and C 
will be informed of the decision. 
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Participants A and C cannot make any decisions during this study. We ask the 
participants A and C, however, to indicate their expectations about the participant 
B’s behavior in each period. 
After all participants have been informed about their payments in a period, the next 
period will begin.  
Your earnings in this study are the payment out of one randomly selected 
period.
Because you do not know which period the computer will randomly select, you 
must consider your decisions – if you are a participant B – in each of the 24 
periods very carefully. 
At the end of the study, the corresponding point amount will be converted to 
Swiss francs and paid in cash to you together with the initial endowment. 
Do you have any further questions? If yes, please raise your hand. We will come to 
you at your workplace. Otherwise, we ask you to answer the control questions on the 
next pages. 
 
Control questions 
1. Assume that participant B chooses a new distribution and this is a “distribution 
without effect on participant C.”  
How high are the payments to the participants A, B, and C randomly assigned to 
each other in this period? 
2. Assume that participant B chooses a new distribution and this is a “distribution 
with a loss for participant C.” 
How high are the payments to the participants A, B, and C randomly assigned to 
each other in this period? 
3. Assume that participant B chooses no new distribution. 
How high are the payments to the participants A, B, and C randomly assigned to 
each other in this period? 
Please raise your hand when you have completed the control questions. We will then 
come to you at your workplace. 
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